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Abstract—Fiber-wireless (FiWi) access mesh networks have
been proposed as flexible and cost-effective solutions for future
access networks. However, for FiWi access mesh networks to
provide end-to-end QoS guarantees to its customers, efficient
QoS routing schemes and scheduling policies become necessary.
Here we provide a model, using repeated game theory, that
creates ground for scheduling policies to be implemented. That
is, our framework provides insights into how much bandwidth
a wireless router needs to share, for foreign traffic forwarding,
so that services of local users and services of foreign users can
all receive bandwidth in a balanced way. Some strategies were
tested, under the developed model, to look for equilibrium states.
The equilibrium strategies provide the means for QoS guarantees
in FiWi access mesh networks, meaning that they can be used
as a basis for scheduling policies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Optical and wireless communications were initially devel-
oped with different objectives [1]. Optical communications
were developed for high bandwidth and long distance com-
munications, whereas wireless communications were devel-
oped for short distance communications with low bandwidth
requirements. However, the rise of bandwidth intensive appli-
cations, the way people now communicate, and the advances
that have been made in wireless technologies, which allow
for much higher bandwidths, are accelerating research in
hybrid fiber-wireless (FiWi) access networks. The driving
forces for such research are that it may be too expensive
and geographically difficult to install fiber to every home, and
having a wireless network from the central office (CO) to every
home may be technically impossible due to limited spectrum.
Therefore, having fiber as far as possible from the CO to the
end users and then wireless at the front end can provide a
flexible and cost-effective solution. Besides flexibility, such
approach provides higher bandwidth than digital subscriber
lines (DSL) or cable modem technologies [2]. There are
already proposals for FiWi access mesh networks [3], [4].
In most of the FiWi access network proposals, the wireless
front end is composed of wireless routers, which accept
connections from users, and wireless gateway routers that are
connected to optical network units (ONUs) to send/receive
traffic to/from the optical link. For wireless routers to suc-
cessfully communicate with gateways, packets may need to be
forwarded by intermediate wireless routers. Hence, wireless
routers have to forward traffic from other routers besides
their own. The question is how to provide resources, at each
router, in order to meet the requirements of local and foreign
communications. Moreover, how to meet that goal throughout
the wireless section in an efficient manner. Undoubtedly, two
major building blocks are the establishment of efficient QoS
routing schemes and scheduling policies. Here we provide a
model, using repeated game theory, that creates ground for
scheduling policies to be implemented. That is, our framework
provides insights into how much bandwidth a wireless router
needs to share, for foreign traffic forwarding, so that services
of local and foreign users can all receive bandwidth in a
balanced way, creating ground for QoS guarantees.
There is already some work using game theory on wireless
meshes [5], [6], [7], [8]. However, traditional wireless mesh
networks work differently from FiWi access mesh networks.
At the former, traffic can be sent towards any node and can
flow through any intermediate nodes in the network. A node
at the latter only sends/receives traffic to/from the Internet
through gateways. As far as we know, repeated game theory
has not been previously applied to FiWi networks.
In this paper we address the problem of equilibrium in FiWi
access mesh networks. That is, the possibility of a balance
between the shared bandwidth and the bandwidth for the
router itself, called here self bandwidth. If there is a good
balance in every router, then end-to-end QoS guarantees can
be implemented because the performance of the FiWi access
mesh network is more predictable. With that in mind, we
have created a repeated game theory model, and searched
for strategies to be implemented at routers and gateways
that enable good bandwidth balancing at the access wireless
section. This model may serve as a basis for the development
of QoS scheduling policies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the FiWi access mesh network model. Section III
discusses the proposed repeated game model while introducing
concepts from repeated game theory. Section IV discusses
simulations and strategies used. Section V analyses the results,
and Section VI ends the paper with conclusions.
II. NETWORK MODEL
In a FiWi access mesh network, the interface with the user
is made using a multi-hop wireless mesh network similar to
the one in Fig. 1, the San Francisco Network (SFNet) taken
from [4]. For packets to travel from the user to the gateway,
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Fig. 1. San Francisco Network (SFNet).
Fig. 2. Independent networks created by the shortest paths calculation.
some routers will have to forward traffic. In this article we
assume that traffic flows according to the shortest path.
For a FiWi access mesh network N , with R routers and G
gateway routers, let us consider only the links that belong to
the shortest path between each router and its nearest gateway
router, so that a disconnected network composed of G smaller
connected subnetworks, N1,N2, ...,NG, is obtained, as shown
in Fig. 2. In this article these smaller connected networks
are called independent networks, having tree structures. Nodes
from lower levels in the tree structure depend solely on nodes
at higher levels to send and receive traffic to and from the
Internet. The model developed in this article is applied to each
independent network in a FiWi access mesh network.
Each independent network, Ni, i = 1, 2, ..., G, has a gate-
way, denoted by gi, and ni routers, r1, r2, ..., rni . Clearly,∑G
i=1 ni = R. For simplicity, we denote the set of routers
in an independent network Ni by Ri, and the gateway by
gi. Every router rj ∈ Ri, for j = 1, ..., ni and i = 1, ..., G,
has a set of users connected to it that together receive down-
stream traffic, Drj (t), and generate upstream traffic, Urj (t),
throughout time t.
Every router that is not a leaf in the tree structures (see
Fig. 2) has to forward some traffic from foreign users so
that the network can work properly. In this article, the routers
that are not leafs in the tree structure are called forwarding
routers, and the routers that are leafs are called non forwarding
routers. The set of forwarding routers from an independent
network Ni,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G}, is denoted by Fi, containing
Fi forwarding routers, f1, f2, ..., fFi . Note that Fi ⊂ Ri.
Each forwarding router fj ,∀j ∈ {1, ..., Fi} ,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G},
forwards traffic from foreign users according to a variable
called cooperation level, λfj (t) ∈ [0, 1], that represents
the fraction of forwarded traffic belonging to other wireless
routers. The value 0 and 1 represent full defection and full
cooperation, respectively. A forwarding router has the freedom
to change the cooperation level along time t. In this paper, we
use the term router to mean either a forwarding router or a
non forwarding router, that is not a gateway. We also use the
term node to either refer to a router or a gateway.
For a clearer discussion of the model, we assume that
gateways do not have users connected to them. However, the
model can easily be extended to consider local traffic if the
gateway routers are assumed to be composed of two connected
parts: an ordinary forwarding router and a gateway router. A
gateway gi,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G}, only forwards traffic from routers
in the same independent network Ni. Every gateway gi, has
a vector μgi (t) including the cooperation level with every
router rj , denoted by μgirj (t) ,∀j ∈ {1, ..., ni}. That is, μgirj (t)
represents the cooperation level applied by the gateway gi to
router rj , throughout time t, and their sum must equal 1:
ni∑
j=1
μgirj (t) = 1,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G} . (1)
III. REPEATED GAME MODEL
A. Notation
Our repeated game model is inspired by the forwarder’s
dilemma game [6]. Before getting into the details of the model,
the following notation must be introduced:
G Total number of gateways in the FiWi access mesh
network. It is also the total number of independent
networks since each includes a single gateway.
R Total number of routers in the FiWi access mesh
network, except gateway routers.
Ni Independent network that emerges when the shortest
path routing is applied.
Ri Set of routers in the independent network Ni. This
set does not include the gateway of Ni.
Fi Set of forwarding routers in the independent network
Ni.
gi Gateway router in the independent network Ni.
λfj (t)Cooperation level of a forwarding router fj ,∀j ∈
{1, ..., Fi} ,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G}, throughout time t.
μgi (t) Cooperation level vector of gateway gi,∀i ∈
{1, ..., G}, throughout time t.
μgirj (t)Cooperation level of gateway gi with router rj ,∀j ∈{1, ..., ni} ,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G}, throughout time t.
Drj (t)Downstream traffic destined to router rj ,∀j ∈
{1, ..., ni} ,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G}, throughout time t.
Urj (t)Upstream traffic from router rj ,∀j ∈
{1, ..., ni} ,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G}, throughout time
t.
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Γ+k Set that contains all the descendants of node k in its
independent network.
Γ−k Set that contains all the ancestors of node k in its
independent network.
B. Stage Game
Repeated games are composed of many stages, and in
each stage there is a game called stage game. The time t,
used throughout the article, does not refer to continuous time
but rather to stages. The model for the stage game will be
explained next.
Let us consider the independent network of gateway 5 in
Fig. 2. Node 1 has D1 (t) of downstream traffic destined to
it. However, the gateway only forwards a fraction, μ51 (t),
of the traffic D1 (t) and router 2 only forwards a frac-
tion, λ2 (t), of the traffic D1 (t)μ51 (t). So, router 1 receives
D1 (t)μ51 (t)λ2 (t) of downstream traffic. Generalizing, the
received downstream traffic for any router rj ∈ Ri,∀j ∈
{1, ..., ni} ,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G}, can be calculated using 1:
drj (t) = Drj (t)μ
gi
rj (t)
∏
k∈
(
Γ−rj \gi
)λk (t). (2)
The same happens for upstream. Considering router 1, only
U1 (t)λ2 (t)μ51 (t) of traffic from router 1 arrives the optical
section. To calculate the upstream traffic, for any router rj ∈
Ri,∀j ∈ {1, ..., ni} ,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G}, we use:
urj (t) = Urj (t)μ
gi
rj (t)
∏
k∈
(
Γ−rj \gi
)λk (t). (3)
The total traffic (downstream and upstream) belonging to the
users of a router rj successfully received and transmitted, at
stage t, will be:
τrj (t) = drj (t) + urj (t) ,
,∀j ∈ {1, ..., ni} ,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G} . (4)
Forwarding routers will have to forward traffic besides their
own, as already explained in Section II. Such forwarded traffic
can be calculated by:
θfj (t) = αfj (t)λfj (t) ,
,∀j ∈ {1, ..., Fi} ,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G} , (5)
where αfj is the sum of all the traffic that router fj re-
ceives/sends from/to other routers:
αfj (t) =
∑
k∈Γ+
fj
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣Uk (t)
∏
m∈
(
Γ+
fj
∩Γ−
k
)λm (t)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦+
+
∑
k∈Γ+
fj
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣Dk (t)μ
gi
k (t)
∏
m∈
(
Γ−
fj
∩Γ+gi
)λm (t)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦.
1Note that the product of an empty set equals one.
Concerning the gateway, the forwarded traffic can be cal-
culated using the following expression:
θgi (t) =
∑
k∈Γ+gi
[Dk (t)μ
gi
k (t)] +
+
∑
k∈Γ+gi
⎡
⎢⎣Uk (t)μgik (t)
∏
m∈(Γ+gi∩Γ
−
k )
λm (t)
⎤
⎥⎦,
,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G} . (6)
To measure the interests of players, stage payoff functions
are used. We have different stage payoff functions for forward-
ing and gateway routers because of their different objectives.
The stage payoff of forwarding routers, υfj (t), is calculated
by the sum of two functions. The first is a gain function
ρfj
(
τfj (t)
)
,∀j ∈ {1, ..., Fi} ,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G}, dependent
on the traffic successfully sent and received. The second is
a negative cost function c
(
θfj (t)
)
,∀j ∈ {1, ..., Fi} ,∀i ∈
{1, ..., G}, that depends on the traffic forwarded to other
routers. Thus the stage payoff of a forwarding router will be:
υfj (t) = ρfj
(
τfj (t)
)
+ c
(
θfj (t)
)
,
,∀j ∈ {1, ..., Fi} ,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G} . (7)
Therefore, in order to have a high payoff, it is in the interest
of the forwarding routers to forward a low amount of foreign
traffic, and send a high amount of local traffic.
For the gateway, whose objective is to forward as much
traffic as possible, the stage payoff is calculated using just a
gain function ρgi (θgi (t)) ,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G}, that depends on
the total amount of traffic the gateway forwards:
υgi (t) = ρgi (θgi (t)) ,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G} . (8)
Note that gateways have a higher payoff if they forward more
traffic. Therefore, it is in the interest of the gateway that
forwarding routers forward a high amount of traffic.
Forwarding routers and gateways are the only nodes that can
make decisions about the game since they are the ones that
can decide how much traffic to forward. Hence, the forwarding
routers and the gateways are the only players in the game.
C. Repeated Game
A repeated game consists in a number of repetitions of some
stage game. In every stage, players decide the actions to take
based on the stage payoff they get. A player can decide for the
action that gives him the highest payoff. However, that action
can cause loss to other players in the game, and these other
players can, in future stages, punish that player. Therefore, in
a repeated game, the players have to worry about present and
future stage payoffs when deciding which action to take [9].
A forwarding router might choose to defect in order to have a
higher payoff, however, the gateway can punish the defecting
forwarding router in future stages, leading to a lower future
stage payoff. A weighted sum of current and future payoffs
can help players to know if some action will not lead into
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lower future stage payoffs. The following discounting payoff
function is used to calculate that weighted sum:
Υk = (1− δ)
∞∑
t=0
δtυk (t),
,∀j ∈ {1, ..., Fi} ,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G} , (9)
for k = fj ∨ gi, and 0 ≤ δ < 1, which is called discount-
ing factor. With the game progression, t increases and δt
decreases, meaning that future stage payoffs are less important
than current ones. Note that δt represents δ raised to t, and not
an indexed value. Also, high and low values of δ characterize
players more concerned with future and immediate payoffs,
respectively [9].
In each stage t, players have to choose their cooperation
levels based on strategies. The strategy of a player is a function
that indicates the cooperation level to use in every stage t.
For the forwarding routers, the strategy, σfj (.), depends on
the downstream and upstream traffic perceived in the previous
stage, τfj (t− 1) ,∀j ∈ {1, ..., Fi} ,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G}. Thus:
λfj (t) = σfj
(
τfj (t− 1)
)
. (10)
For the gateways, the strategy depends on the coopera-
tion levels of the forwarding routers in the previous stage,
λfj (t− 1) ,∀j ∈ {1, ..., Fi} ,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G}. The gateways
treat non forwarding routers as always cooperating forwarding
routers. Thus, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., ni} ,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G}:
μgirj (t) = σgi
(
λrj (t− 1)
)
. (11)
If some forwarding router successfully received and sent
a low amount of traffic in the previous stage (t− 1), then
it can punish other players by forwarding less traffic, i.e.
lower λfj (t) ,∀j ∈ {1, ..., Fi} ,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G}. Whenever a
forwarding router defects, the gateway will be able to punish
it by decreasing the respective cooperation level.
D. Definitions
Prior to explain simulations and results, we introduce some
definitions partly taken from [9]. In the following, we use
the term player when referring to either a forwarding router
or a gateway, σk represents a strategy of a player k ∈
{Fi ∪ gi} ,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G}, and Σk represents the set of all
the strategies for player k.
Definition 1. A strategy profile, σ, is the set of all the
strategies used by all players in some game instance, i.e.
σ =
(
σf1 , σf2 , ..., σfFi , σgi
)
,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G}, and Σ is the
set of all strategy profiles.
Definition 2. −k represents all players except k. For instance,
the strategy profile (σk, σ−k) includes the strategy σk, from
player k, and the strategy profile from all the other players,
σ−k.
Definition 3. The strategy profile σ = (σk, σ−k) is a Nash
equilibrium if for all players k ∈ {Fi ∪ gi} ,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G}
and all strategies σ′k = σk,
Υk (σ) ≥ Υk (σ′k, σ−k) , (12)
i.e., there is no other strategy profile that can result in a higher
discounted payoff. Here, Υk (σ) refers to the discounting
payoff, from (9), when using the strategy profile σ.
Definition 4. The set of actions played until some stage t is
given by the history ht. In our model, the actions of the players
are the cooperation levels.
Definition 5. The strategy σk (ht), which is a function depen-
dent on the previous actions, outputs the action that will be
used by player k in the next stage t + 1, ∀k = fj ∨ gi,∀j ∈
{1, ..., Fi} ,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G}.
Definition 6. Ht is the set of all the possible histories up to
time t, and H is the infinite set of all the possible histories
for all the possible stages t.
Definition 7. Nash equilibrium is borrowed from non repeated
game theory and is too permissive in games with nontrivial
dynamic structures like the repeated games. Nash equilibrium
has no notion of future payoffs, neglecting possible equilibri-
ums beneath a stage not in accordance with Nash equilibrium.
The subgame-perfection strengthens Nash equilibrium by tak-
ing all the possible histories H into account. A strategy profile
σ is a subgame-perfect equilibrium if, for all histories ht ∈ H,
σ (ht) is a Nash equilibrium.
Definition 8. The one-shot deviation allows to check if some
strategy profile is subgame-perfect. The principle is to deviate
from the strategy at one stage, get back to the strategy in
use and check if the deviation leads to a higher payoff. If
the deviation leads to a higher payoff then the strategy is
not subgame-perfect. Let us fix a strategy profile σ−k for
the opponents of k and assume a one-shot deviation σˆk from
strategy σk of player k. The deviation σˆk is profitable if, at
some history ht, it happens that hσˆkt = h
σk
t and
Υk (σˆk (ht+1) , σ−k (ht+1)) > Υk (σ (ht+1)) . (13)
IV. STRATEGIES AND SIMULATION
A. Strategies
To study equilibrium in a FiWi access mesh network, we
use the following known strategies, that rely on two possible
actions: cooperation and non-cooperation [9]. However, the
cooperation levels in our game can have any value in [0, 1].
We consider a low cooperation level as not cooperating, 0.1,
and a high cooperation level as cooperating, 0.8.
Tit-For-Tat (TFT): The player mimics the previous action of
the opponent. The first action is to cooperate.
Anti-Tit-For-Tat (ATFT): The player mimics the previous
action of the opponent. The first action is not to cooperate.
Grim Trigger (GT): Punishes the opponent forever as soon
as the opponent does not cooperate.
Always Cooperate (Al-C): Whatever the opponent does, the
player always cooperates.
Always Defect (Al-D): Whatever the opponent does, the
player never cooperates.
978-1-4244-5638-3/10/$26.00 ©2010 IEEE
This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE Globecom 2010 proceedings.
B. Simulation
Simulations were done for SFNet in Fig. 1. We consider
that nodes receive three times more traffic than they send.
The gain and cost functions, used in (7), are shown to
be dependent on τfj (t) and θfj (t), respectively. To simplify
simulations, the gain is assumed to be the amount of traffic
successfully sent and received, while the cost is the symmetric
of the amount of forwarded traffic. So, the stage payoff of
forwarding routers in our simulations is:
υ′fj (t) = τfj (t) +
[−θfj (t)
]
,
∀j ∈ {1, ..., Fi} ,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G} . (14)
Depending on the network behavior other possibilities exist,
e.g. a function that mimics signal interference. The same was
considered for the gateway, i.e. the payoff is considered to be
the actual amount of traffic that the gateway forwards:
υ′gi (t) = θgi (t) ,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G} . (15)
In our simulations, the cooperation levels that a gateway gi
applies to a router rj is calculated using:
μgirj =
λrj∑ni
k=1 λrk
,∀j ∈ {1, ..., ni} ,∀i ∈ {1, ..., G} . (16)
V. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
In this section, the one-shot deviation principle was used to
search for strategy profiles in equilibrium. Table I shows the
strategy profiles in equilibrium with the cooperation levels of
0.1 and 0.8 for defecting and cooperating, respectively, along
with the necessary δ intervals for each player. Notice that in
the independent network of gateway 16, when using the one-
shot deviation principle, the gateway can make a deviation
against node 12 or node 8. In Table I, only the δ intervals
for the deviation against node 8 are presented since these δ
intervals are smaller and more limitative than the δ intervals
for the deviation against 12.
Notice that the equilibrium strategies are the same for
independent networks of gateways 5, 13 and 22. This happens
because these networks have a similar structure: a gateway, a
forwarding router, and some non forwarding routers. For the
independent network of gateway 16, the set of equilibrium
strategy profiles is different, because its structure is different
from the previous ones, as shown in Fig. 2.
The δ intervals for which the strategy profiles are in equilib-
rium are very large in the independent networks of gateways
5, 13 and 22. Almost all the strategy profiles can have any
value for δ, except strategy profile (Al-C, GT). That makes
sense because (Al-C, GT) requires the forwarding router to
always cooperate no matter what happens in the game, making
the deviation more appealing. This means that there are less
possible values for δ to achieve equilibrium. Also, when
using (Al-C, GT), the δ interval required for equilibrium is
smaller for the forwarding router at the independent network
of gateway 5. This is due to the fact that more nodes depend on
the forwarding router for traffic delivery. For the same strategy
profile, (Al-C, GT), the forwarding router 14, from the network
of gateway 22, also has a slightly smaller δ interval, when
comparing it with forwarding router 10, of network 13, due to
the higher number of non forwarding routers dependent on the
gateway in that network, as shown in Fig. 2. Hence, having
more non forwarding routers dependent on forwarding routers
has a high impact on equilibrium.
The δ interval, besides being used to check how easily a
strategy profile can be in equilibrium, can also be used to
make a parallel with real network parameters. As explained in
Section III-C, high and low values of δ represent players more
concerned with future or current payoffs, respectively. This can
be compared with different QoS requirements of services. For
instance, VoIP or IPTV are more concerned with immediate
payoffs while web browsing and email services are not. As
a result, scheduling algorithms can be developed based on
strategy profiles for high or low QoS requirements.
In what concerns to the use of strategies by players, we
can see that, when in equilibrium, ATFT strategy is used by
forwarding routers only. This means that ATFT strategy may
be more suitable for forwarding routers. Since this behavior is
present for all independent networks, this particularity seems
not to be related with the network under study, but more related
with different goals of router and gateway players.
Results presented in Table I were obtained using cooperation
levels of 0.1 and 0.8 for defecting and cooperating, respec-
tively. However, changing the cooperation level values may
change the δ intervals and can even turn the equilibrium of a
strategy profile into non equilibrium. Considering the strategy
profile (Al-C, GT) in the independent networks of gateways 5,
13 and 22, Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b) show the increase of the left
margin of the δ interval when the defecting and cooperating
cooperation level increase, respectively. Increasing either the
cooperating or the defecting cooperation level leads into a
narrower δ interval. This makes sense since higher cooperation
levels force forwarding routers to forward more traffic, as can
be seen in (5). Deciding for narrow or wide δ intervals must
be investigated when developing scheduling algorithms.
In Fig. 3(c), it is shown that changing cooperation levels
can even turn a strategy profile into non-equilibrium. It shows
what happens to the left margin of the δ interval of gateway 16,
with strategy profile (TFT, ATFT, TFT), when the cooperation
level is too low for cooperating. When it is lower than
approximately 0.7, the left margin of the δ interval becomes
higher than 1 and, as explained in Section III-C, δ can only
have values between 0 and 1. Notice that, contrarily to the
forwarding routers, high cooperating and defecting levels in
gateways lead to larger δ intervals, since their main objective
is to forward traffic. This results tell us that it is important to
carefully choose the cooperation levels for network players.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we address the problem of how much band-
width a wireless router needs to share, for foreign traffic
forwarding, so that services of local and foreign users can
all receive bandwidth in a balanced way, creating ground for
QoS guarantees. A game theoretical approach is proposed. The
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(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 3. δ interval impacts: a) on forwarding routers when increasing defecting level; b) on forwarding routers when increasing cooperating level c) on
gateway 16 when increasing cooperating level.
TABLE I
STRATEGY PROFILES IN EQUILIBRIUM.
strategy profiles δ intervals for equilibrium
Independent
network of
gateway
16
(8, 12, 16) node 8 node 12
node 16
deviation
against 8
(TFT, ATFT, TFT) 0.69 - 1 0 - 1 0.70 - 1
(ATFT, ATFT, TFT) 0 - 0.69 0 - 1 0.48 - 1
(GT, ATFT, TFT) 0.69 - 1 0 - 1 0.58 - 1
(ATFT, ATFT, GT) 0 - 1 0 - 1 0.48 - 1
(ATFT, ATFT, Al-C) 0 - 1 0 - 1 0.76 - 1
(ATFT, Al-C, GT) 0 - 1 0 - 1 0 - 1
(Al-D, Al-C, GT) 0 - 1 0.57 - 1 0 - 1
Independent
network of
gateway 5
(2, 5) node 2 node 5
(ATFT, TFT) 0 - 1 0 - 1
(ATFT, GT) 0 - 1 0 - 1
(ATFT, All-C) 0 - 1 0 - 1
(Al-C, GT) 0.72 - 1 0 - 1
(Al-D, TFT) 0 - 1 0 - 1
(Al-D, GT) 0 - 1 0 - 1
(Al-D, Al-C) 0 - 1 0 - 1
Independent
network of
gateway
13
(10, 13) node 10 node 13
(ATFT, TFT) 0 - 1 0 - 1
(ATFT, GT) 0 - 1 0 - 1
(ATFT, All-C) 0 - 1 0 - 1
(Al-C, GT) 0.55 - 1 0 - 1
(Al-D, TFT) 0 - 1 0 - 1
(Al-D, GT) 0 - 1 0 - 1
(Al-D, Al-C) 0 - 1 0 - 1
Independent
network of
gateway
22
(14, 22) node 14 node 22
(ATFT, TFT) 0 - 1 0 - 1
(ATFT, GT) 0 - 1 0 - 1
(ATFT, All-C) 0 - 1 0 - 1
(Al-C, GT) 0.59 - 1 0 - 1
(Al-D, TFT) 0 - 1 0 - 1
(Al-D, GT) 0 - 1 0 - 1
(Al-D, Al-C) 0 - 1 0 - 1
analysis of results indicate that the equilibrium is possible,
depending on the value of δ, which can be translated to a
parameter of a scheduling algorithm based on the equilibrium
strategy profiles. Also, the ATFT strategy seams to be more
suitable to forwarding routers meaning that, in future work,
this strategy may be used by algorithms to provide the needed
QoS requirements. In future work, the right cooperation levels
for cooperation and defection, and their influence when im-
plementing QoS, must be investigated since variations at the
δ interval occur. Technology related case studies must be also
analyzed in the future.
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